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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test the association between board of director
characteristics and corporate reputation.
Design/methodology/approach – Logistic and multivariate regressions are performed to analyse
whether the board of director characteristics are associated with the level of corporate reputation. The
sample is composed of listed companies in the Madrid Stock Exchange (Índice General de la Bolsa de
Madrid) at least once during the period 2004-2010. Corporate governance data were manually extracted
from governance reports released by Spanish companies. The data for the design of a corporate
reputation measure were obtained from the Monitor Español de Reputación Corporativa (MERCO)
institute web site.
Findings – Results from the empirical analysis show that Spanish companies that appear high up in
terms of ranking in the reputation index provided by MERCO tend to have a higher percentage of
independent directors as well as more female directors on their board. Firm size and the image of the
president of a firm are also linked to corporate reputation.
Originality/value – The results have direct implications for the management of corporate
governance mechanisms by shareholders who should take into account their role in the creation and
maintenance of corporate reputation.
Keywords Corporate reputation, Corporate governance, Board of directors
Paper type Research paper
Resumen
Objetivo – El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la asociación entre las características de los consejos
de administración y la reputación corporativa.
Metodología – La metodología empleada se basa en el uso de regresiones logísticas y multivariantes.
Nuestra muestra se compone de las empresas que cotizaron en el Índice General de la Bolsa de
Madrid (IGBM) durante el período 2004-2010. Los datos sobre gobierno corporativo se obtuvieron
manualmente a partir de los informes de gobierno corporativo publicados por las empresas españolas.
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La información para diseñar la medida de la reputación corporativa se obtuvo de la página web de
MERCO (Monitor Español de Reputación Corporativa).
Resultados – Los resultados del análisis empírico muestran que las empresas españolas que
aparecen en las posiciones más altas del ranking de reputación corporativa proporcionado por MERCO
tienden a tener un mayor porcentaje de directores independientes y de mujeres en sus consejos
de administración. El tamaño de la empresa y la reputación del presidente también están relacionados
con la reputación corporativa.
Originalidad – Los resultados tienen implicaciones directas para la gestión de los mecanismos de
gobierno corporativo por parte de los accionistas, que deberían considerar el papel de los consejos de
administración en la creación y mantenimiento de la reputación corporativa.
Palabras clave Reputación corporativa, Gobierno corporativo, Consejo de administración
1. Introduction
Corporate governance mechanisms seek to protect investors and maximize corporate
value, as well as increase confidence in capital markets. Previous empirical research
has investigated the relationship between corporate governance and information
quality, earnings management or internal controls (Cohen et al., 2004; Dávila and
Peñalva, 2006; Klein, 2002; Li et al., 2008; Monterrey Mayoral and Sánchez Segura,
2008). An appropriate design of corporate governance practices helps guarantee the
integrity of the accounting function (Monterrey Mayoral and Sánchez Segura, 2008),
and strong corporate governance mechanisms are related with a reduced likelihood of
negative financial outcomes (Carcello et al., 2011). Both academics and regulators have
claimed for the need to improve corporate governance controls. In recent years,
corporate governance codes have been issued by international organisms, especially
after the corporate failures in capital markets because of the lack of transparency in the
financial reporting process.
Firms tend to set up governance mechanisms in order to comply with these codes,
but in many countries the level of corporate governance mechanisms is low (Santiago-
Castro et al., 2009). Nevertheless, given that corporate governance mechanisms seek to
build confidence in capital markets, companies also find incentives to improve them
voluntarily. We expect that companies with better governance practices have a
better image and are more valued in terms of reputation. In particular, the aim of this
paper is to test the association of the characteristics of boards of directors with
corporate reputation.
The board of directors is crucial for the control and monitoring of the most
important decisions to be taken in a company. Boards are relevant mechanisms in the
oversight of managerial actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and lead to potential benefits
for companies. Both agency theory and resource dependence theory have been
commonly used to explain the functions of the board of directors (Hillman and Dalziel,
2003). According to agency theory, the basic function of the board of directors is to
monitor management and protect shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The resource
dependence theory indicates that directors provide valuable resources to companies
(Wernerfelt, 1984). These theories suggest that the board of directors can help reduce
information asymmetries and improve outcomes of a firm, thereby enhancing
investors’ confidence.
To establish the link between corporate governance and firm reputation, our
analysis is based on the reputation building model by Fombrun and Shanley (1990).
These authors see the firm as serving multiple stakeholders that judge the corporate
effectiveness – and, hence, reputation – according to various information signals about
the firms’ activities, achievements and prospects. We incorporate this multidimensional
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nature of corporate reputation by using the MERCO ranking, a ranking that is
constructed from surveys of Spanish managers and evaluations by experts such as
financial analysts, consumer associations, labour unions and others, and therefore
incorporate the assessment of multiple stakeholders.
According to this theoretical conception, an improvement in stakeholders’
perceptions about a firm leads to an improvement in corporate reputation, and
this would bring important benefits to the firm. Reputation builds competitive
advantage (Hall, 1993; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) and
improves financial performance (Fernández and Luna, 2007; Roberts and Dowling,
2002). More relevant for the purpose of this research, several authors have pointed
out that the ultimate responsibility for the achievement and maintenance of a
good reputation lies with the board of directors and the CEO (Dowling, 2004;
Kitchen and Laurence, 2003; Mintzberg, 1983; Tonello, 2007). However, as far as we
are concerned, little research exists on the relationship between corporate governance
and reputation.
Our sample is composed of listed companies in the Madrid Stock Exchange (Índice
General de la Bolsa de Madrid, IGBM) at least once during the 2004-2010 period.
Corporate governance data were manually extracted from governance reports released
by Spanish companies. The data for the design of a corporate reputation measure were
obtained from the Monitor Español de Reputación Corporativa (MERCO) institute
web site.
Results from the empirical analysis show that both the proportion of independent
directors and the percentage of women on the board are associated with the level of
corporate reputation. Companies that are ranked high up in the reputation ranking
published by MERCO tend to have a higher percentage of independent directors and a
higher percentage of women on their board.
These results have implications for shareholders who must be aware of the fact that
an adequate management of corporate governance mechanisms will help in the creation
and maintenance of corporate reputation and as a result increase the value of their
investments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The literature regarding
reputation and corporate governance is reviewed in the next section, where the
hypotheses are formulated. Section 3 describes data collection, the sample and explains
the research method. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis and
sensitivity tests are included in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the
contributions of the paper.
2. Previous literature and hypothesis development
Following Fombrun (1996, p. 72) reputation can be defined as “a perceptual
representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s
overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals”.
In today’s turbulent economic environment, reputation and trustworthiness have
become a major issue for the stakeholders to rely on the company. Previous research
shows that a good reputation has valuable benefits for the companies as it sustains
competitive advantage (Hall, 1993; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Weigelt and Camerer,
1988), improves financial performance (Deephouse, 2000; Fernández and Luna, 2007;
Kotha et al. 2001; McGuire et al, 1990; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Sabate and Puente,
2003), lowers costs (Fombrun, 1996) and attracts the best talents (Hill and Knowlton,
2008; Fombrun, 1996), among others.
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The literature on corporate reputation is extensive, but there is no unifying
conceptual framework, as numerous theories have been used to examine corporate
reputation. The most commonly used theories are institutional theory, signalling theory
and resource-based view. Institutional theory has been used when research focuses on
building reputation, signalling theory is applied to understand the process of building,
maintaining and defending a reputation, and, finally, the focus of the resource-based
view is on the outcome, as it examines reputation as a rare and valuable intangible
resource that leads to sustained competitive advantage (Walker, 2010, pp. 376-377).
For the purpose of this paper, we follow the theoretical considerations of Fombrun
and Shanley (1990). According to these authors, reputation is built from stakeholders’
perceptions and represents the public’s cumulative judgements of the firm over time.
These perceptions are formed using market and accounting signals indicating
performance, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms and strategy
signals indicating strategic postures.
Corporate governance mechanisms are established to protect investors and
secure value maximization, increasing confidence on the functioning of capital
markets. Previous empirical research has investigated the influence of corporate
governance on information quality, earnings management or internal controls,
among other variables (Cohen et al., 2004; Dávila and Peñalva, 2006; Klein, 2002;
Li et al., 2008; Monterrey Mayoral et al., 2008). However, as far as we are concerned,
the relationship between corporate governance and reputation has not been fully
explored yet.
Corporate governance recommendations are established in corporate governance
codes all over the world. According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004, p. 417), these
codes are “a set of best practice recommendations regarding the behaviour and
structure of a firm’s board of directors”. Recommendations are similar in most of
the governance codes. In the European Union, a comparative study of corporate
governance codes was undertaken at the beginning of the previous decade (European
Commission, Internal Market Directorate General, 2002). The conclusions of this study
show that the code recommendations are fairly similar and serve as a converging force.
The codes express remarkable consensus on issues relating to board structure, roles
and responsibilities, as well as issues on board independence.
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies (Brown
et al., 2011). In addition, the board of directors is crucial for decision making within a
firm, and it is responsible for setting objectives, monitoring and controlling the firm’s
activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Internationally, the main recommendations in the
codes of good governance refer to the board of directors, regarding its composition,
frequency of meetings, a minimum number of non-executive and independent directors,
the separation between the roles of chairman and CEO, etc. (Zanotti and Cuomo, 2008).
Our empirical analysis explores how these board of director characteristics are related
to the reputation of the company. Agency theory argues that the board of directors
must protect shareholders and reduce agency conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory emphasizes that directors
bring a variety of valuable resources to a company (Barroso et al., 2011; Wernerfelt,
1984). According to these theories, more effective boards should mitigate the conflict of
interests between the company and outsiders, and enhance the outcomes of a firm.
Therefore, we expect that these board of director characteristics may increase
confidence in terms of a company and hence, its reputation. Good governance will be
positively perceived by the various stakeholders if it is a signal of the board’s
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commitment to corporate success. We see the establishment of a particular board
structure as a signal that indicates performance, conformity to social norms and
strategic postures in the sense of Fombrun and Shanley (1990) model.
2.1 Board and CEO independence and corporate reputation
Several authors have pointed out that the ultimate responsibility for the achievement
and maintenance of a good reputation lies with the board of directors and the CEO
(Dowling, 2004; Kitchen and Laurence, 2003; Mintzberg, 1983; Tonello, 2007). Hill and
Knowlton consultancy company[1] has been regularly undertaking analyses of
corporate reputation which produces a report named Corporate Reputation Watch
(CRW). The CRW highlights, over several years, the importance of corporate reputation
and the relevance of the role played by the CEO and other board members in managing
reputation. The findings in the study by Kitchen and Laurence (2003)[2] on business
executives’ opinions suggest that for most of the companies the primarily responsible
person for managing reputation is the CEO. Financial analysts interviewed by the
CRW 2006 report[3] (Hill and Knowlton, 2006) also consider that the CEO’s reputation is
crucial when making their judgements.
CEO duality has been used as an indicator of the CEO’s power and board
independence (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Zhang, 2012). CEO duality occurs when the CEO
is the same person as the chairman of the board. The separation of the two positions
reduces CEO influence over the board and enhances the independence of the board
(Zhang, 2012). Theoretically, the separation of the titles of CEO and chairman will help
maintain impartiality, reduce agency costs in corporations and improve economic
consequences for firms (Donelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, an independent CEO
may influence the perception of external agents that a board will function more
effectively.
On the other hand, outside or independent directors are perceived as a tool for
monitoring behaviour and reducing managerial opportunism (Ho and Wong, 2001;
Klapper and Love, 2002; La Porta et al., 2000). Independent directors tend to protect
shareholders’ interests and mitigate agency conflicts, and they may be more likely to
follow ethical conducts (Prado Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2014; Zhang,
2012). In addition, independent directors are professionals without a managerial role
who have incentives to defend or build their reputation as expert monitors ( Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). They provide expertise and contacts,
advice on the public presentation of the activities of a company and hence, it may be
expected they help improve the prestige and image of a company in society (Haniffa
and Cooke, 2005).
Considering the previous arguments, the next hypotheses are formulated:
H1a. There is a positive association between CEO duality and the reputation of the
company.
H1b. There is a positive association between board independence and the reputation
of the company.
2.2 Board gender and corporate reputation
Prior literature about the role of women in the boardroom also draws on agency theory
and resource dependence theory. Female directors are expected to increase board
independence since women may ask questions and provide new insights that would not
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come from directors with more traditional backgrounds (Carter et al., 2003). Following
an agency approach, women often bring a fresh perspective to complex issues,
and this can improve strategy formulation and decision-making processes that protect
investors (Francoeur et al., 2008). Furthermore, women provide important resources
that can increase a firm’s competitive advantage. According to Campbell and
Mínguez-Vera (2008, pp. 439-440), greater diversity promotes a better understanding of
the marketplace by matching the diversity of a firm’s directors to the diversity of its
potential customers and employees. In addition, diversity increases creativity and
innovation.
The presence of women on boards can increase corporate reputation not only
because of the benefits indicated above, but also if the various stakeholders sense that
it is a sign of the firm’s sensitivity to pressures from the general public for increasing
participation of women on corporate boards (Daily et al., 1999). This can also indirectly
affect reputation, as the presence of women on boards can influence perceptions about
corporate effectiveness (Brammer et al., 2009).
Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000, p. 139) indicate how institutional investors and
other shareholders’ associations exert pressure on corporate boards to increase the
representation and use of women directors. In the Spanish context, a new organic law
(Ley Orgánica, 2007) was introduced in 2007 aimed at achieving effective equality
for women and men at all levels. Regarding corporate governance, article 75 of this
law establishes that those firms that cannot publish their income statement in the
abbreviated format should try to include on their board of directors a number of women
that allows for achieving a balanced representation of women and men in a maximum
of eight years after the approval of the law.
The previous arguments lead us to think that the presence of women on boards may
lead to important benefits for a company and improve the stakeholders’ judgements
regarding the response of the firm to the claims from society for the increased presence
of women corporate directors. Improved stakeholders’ perceptions will then lead to
increased reputation. Therefore, the next hypothesis is proposed:
H2. There is a positive association between the percentage of female directors on the
board and the reputation of the company.
2.3 Board activity and corporate reputation
The intensity of board activity is a value-relevant attribute in improving the effectiveness
of a board. Previous research has generally used the number of board meetings as a
measure of board activity. Board activity contributes towards a better monitoring
activity of managers’ decisions (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). Therefore, the number of
board meetings may mitigate agency costs and can be perceived in the market as a sign
of responsible company behaviour. Vafeas (1999) studies the association between board
activity and firm performance and he argues that directors on boards that meet more
frequently are more likely to perform their duties in accordance with shareholders’
interests. On the other hand, in well-functioning organizations board activity is suggested
to be relatively low ( Jensen, 1993). However, boards should increase their activity in the
presence of problems and as a response to poor performance (Vafeas, 1999). These
arguments suggest that board intensity is a mechanism to minimize agency costs and
increase firm outcomes, and this may improve the image of a company in a given society.
Therefore, the next hypothesis is formulated:
H3. There is a positive association between board activity and company reputation.
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3. Empirical analysis
3.1 Sample and data description
Our initial sample was composed of the non-financial listed companies in the IGBM at
least once during the 2004-2010 period. This sample was made up of 406 firm-year
observations (including 76 companies).
The empirical analysis required the design of a measure for corporate reputation,
the selection of the variables about board of director characteristics, and also the
collection of some financial data for the design of control variables.
Reputation is an intangible concept based on perceptions, and therefore difficult to
measure. The problems in the measurement of corporate reputation are one of the main
concerns in this branch of literature (Walker, 2010). In order to design a measure of
corporate reputation, information from the MERCO[4] institute was considered. Since
the year 2000, MERCO annually publishes a ranking of the most reputable firms in
Spain. This ranking is a reference for large companies in Spain in the assessment and
management of their reputation (Fernández and Luna, 2007). The ranking is elaborated
in several steps, from the results of a survey applied to Spanish managers and
evaluations by experts (such as financial analysts, consumer associations, labour
unions, etc.), and verified by an audit firm. Different dimensions that determine a
company’s reputation are evaluated: economic and financial results, information
reporting quality, product and service quality, respect for the consumers’ rights,
environmental and social responsibility, etc. As a result, the most reputable companies
are ranked with a score from 0 to 10,000. This ranking is similar to the one published by
Fortune magazine, which has been widely used in academic journals to measure
corporate reputation in the USA (Chung et al., 2003; Gallego et al., 2010; Lee and Roh,
2012; Roberts and Dowling, 2002).
The reputation data were downloaded from the MERCO web site. All the corporate
governance variables were manually collected by analysing annual reports and
corporate governance reports and examining directors’ biographies. Osiris database
was used to obtain financial data.
There were companies in the sample that were listed on the IGBM, but that did not
appear in the reputation rankings. For that reason we also worked with the
sample of companies that were listed on the IGBM and at the same time appeared
in the MERCO ranking. This sample included 145 firm-year observations (including
31 companies).
3.2 Research design
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and
reputation of Spanish listed firms. We expect that the board of director characteristics
are associated with corporate reputation. A general explanatory model is proposed,
where corporate reputation is the dependent variable, and several board of director
characteristics are considered independent variables. Moreover, certain control
variables with potential effects on companies’ reputations were included in order to
complete the model. All these variables are presented in Table I.
A two-step analysis was performed to study the link between board of director
characteristics and corporate reputation. First, we examined whether those characteristics
are associated with the inclusion of a company in the ranking elaborated by MERCO.
A dummy variable named reputation rank was initially considered to capture corporate
reputation. Reputation rank (REP_RANK) is assigned a value of 1 if a company appears
in the ranking of most reputable firms, and 0 otherwise. Second, a continuous variable,
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named reputation value, was designed in order tomeasure the level of reputation for every
company that was included in the MERCO rankings, by considering the average
reputation as a reference. Reputation value (REP_VALUE) is a relative measure to the
average reputation value in the MERCO index, which is assigned 100 points. This variable
leads us to examine the association between the characteristics of the boards of directors
and the level of corporate reputation.
As discussed in the previous section, several board of director characteristics were
examined: board independence, CEO duality, gender diversity and board activity.
Board independence (B_IND) is measured by the proportion of independent directors
on the board. CEO duality (CEO) was a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the chief
executive officer is also the chairman and 1 otherwise. Gender diversity (B_WOM)
is measured by the proportion of female directors on the board. Board activity is
measured by the number of meetings held in a year (B_ACT).
Various control variables were also included in the statistical models, such as firm
size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), the reputation of the president of the company
(REP_PRESD) and firm leverage (LEV)[5]. Firm size may enhance a company’s ability
to sustain a competitive advantage, and profitability can also increase corporate
reputation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). However, most of the stakeholders are not only
concerned with financial benefit and the attributes of reputation encompass different
firm-related aspects. According to Lee and Roh (2012), these reasons can justify that
profitability is not consistently associated with corporate reputation. Firm size was
measured by total assets divided into one million, and profitability by return on assets.
As pointed out before, several international reports agree on the fact that the CEO also
determines a firm’s reputation. Data on CEO’s reputation was not available, but the
reputation of the president of the company was measured by a ranking provided by
the MERCO institute, named MERCO Líderes, which measures the reputation of the
presidents of the boards of directors of Spanish companies. In particular, various
presidents of companies from our sample were also the CEO of the firm. Firms with a
higher leverage tend to have better reporting practices to satisfy creditors’ needs and
Name Description Definition
Corporate reputation
REP_RANK Reputation ranking Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is included in the MERCO index;
0 otherwise
REP_VALUE Reputation value Value relative to the mean value by MERCO, that is
considered as 100 points
Corporate governance
B_IND Board independence Percentage of independent directors on the board
CEO CEO independence Dummy variable: 0 if the chief executive officer is also the
president; 1 otherwise
B_WOM Board gender Percentage of female directors on the board
B_ACT Board activity Number of board meetings in a year
Control variables
SIZE Firm size Total assets (in million of euros)
ROA Profitability Return on assets
REP_PRESD Reputation of the
president
Dummy variable: 1 if the president of the company is included
in MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise
LEV Firm leverage Ratio of total debt to total asset
Table I.
Variables description
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minimize conflicts of interests ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, an
improvement in their image and corporate reputation can be expected. On the other
hand, leverage has traditionally been used as a proxy for financial risk (Amran et al.,
2009), and this can negatively affect corporate reputation.
A statistical analysis was performed based on the following models, where the
reputation measures were the dependent variables, and the corporate governance
characteristics were considered as explanatory variables:
REP_RANKit ¼ aþb1B_INDitþb2CEOitþb3B_WOMitþb4B_ACTit
þb5SIZEitþb6ROAitþb7REP_PRESitþb8LEVitþe
REP_VALUEit ¼ aþb1B_INDitþb2CEOitþb3B_WOMitþb4B_ACTit
þb5SIZEitþb6ROAitþb7REP_PRESitþb8LEVitþe
4. Results
Our first analysis examines the association between the board of directors and the
inclusion of a company in the MERCO ranking. REP_RANK is employed as a
dependent variable. This study includes the whole sample of the listed companies on
IGBM, regardless whether they were in the ranking elaborated by MERCO or not,
which represents 406 firm-year observations.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table II. The mean of REP_RANK is around 0.5;
therefore, half of the selected companies are also included on the list of reputable
companies. B_IND mean is over 35 per cent, and it represents that more than one-third
of the directors on the board are independent, which indicates that the companies in the
sample comply with the recommendation in the Spanish code of good governance
(Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), 2006). We also highlight the low
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
REP_RANK 0.52 0.50 0 1
B_IND 35.18 17.65 0 87.50
CEO 0.65 0.48 0 1
B_WOM 6.23 8.63 0 44.44
B_ACT 9.58 3.40 3 27
SIZE 34.55 145.92 0.24 1,226.83
ROA 4.04 10.38 −49.31 56.84
REP_PRESD 0.29 0.45 0 1
LEV 0.66 0.192 0.047 1.082
Notes: REP_RANK, reputation rank is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in
MERCO ranking and 0 otherwise; B_IND, board independence indicates the percentage of independent
directors on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 if the CEO is
also the chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the percentage of women on the
board; B_ACT, board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a year; SIZE, firm size is
measured by total assets (in million of euros); ROA, return on assets; REP_PRESD, reputation of the
president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the president of the company is included in
MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise; LEV, ratio of total debt to total assets. 406 firm-year observations
(years 2004-2010)
Table II.
Descriptive statistics
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presence of women on the board, since the average value is around 6 per cent. Almost
two-thirds of the CEOs did not occupy the role of chairman of the board and around
30 per cent of the presidents were included on the list of most reputable managers
published by MERCO. The number of annual meeting was extremely variable. Finally,
although the sample is composed of listed companies, size values and profitability
show high variability. The average total debt to total assets ratio is 0.66.
A panel data study for 2004-2010 was carried out through a logistic regression
analysis in order to determine the association between board of director characteristics
and the likelihood of being included in the reputation ranking. The Hausman test
determined the application of a fixed-effect model, and the results are presented
in Table III.
First, only control variables are included in the model. Firm size appears as a
decisive factor for corporate reputation. Larger companies are more exposed to the
market and visibility can be associated to reliability and trustworthiness. Therefore,
these companies tend to have a better image, since they are more visible and better
Explanatory variables Predicted sign REP_RANK REP_RANK
Intercept −2.775***
(−4.69)
−3.306***
(−3.58)
B_IND + −0.004
(−0.38)
CEO + 0.320
(0.90)
B_WOM + 0.058***
(3.52)
B_ACT + 0.005
(0.09)
SIZE + 0.120***
(3.87)
0.127***
(3.96)
ROA ? 0.021
(1.64)
0.025*
(1.70)
REP_PRESD + 3.236***
(8.78)
3.169***
(8.39)
LEV ? 1.271
(1.45)
1.217
(1.22)
Pseudo R2 0.493 0.517
LR χ2 statistic
(Prob.Wχ2 )
277.40
(0.000)
290.81
(0.000)
Fixed effects model: REP_RANKit¼ α+ β1B_INDit + β2CEOit+ β3B_WOMit+ β4B_ACTit+ β5SIZEit
+ β6ROAit+ β7REP_PRESit + β8LEVit+ ε
Notes: REP_RANK, reputation rank is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in
MERCO ranking and 0 otherwise; B_IND, board independence indicates the percentage of independent
directors on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 if the CEO is
also the chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the percentage of women on the
board; B_ACT, Board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a year; SIZE, firm size is
measured by total assets (in million of euros); ROA, return on assets; REP_PRESD: reputation of the
president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the president of the company is included in MERCO
Líderes and 0 otherwise; LEV: ratio of total debt to total assets. 406 firm-year observations (years 2004-
2010). *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. p-values for the variables with an
expected sign are one-tailed, the p-values for the other variables are two-tailed
Table III.
Logistic regression
analysis
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known to the public (Rose and Thomsen, 2004). Second, the reputation of the
president of a company is also a decisive factor in terms of its inclusion in the MERCO
ranking. Previous studies document that the CEO is responsible for the creation and
maintenance of corporate reputation (Kitchen and Laurence, 2003; Mintzberg, 1983).
Our evidence sheds some light on the importance of the role of a company’s president
since s/he can affect the perceptions of investors and other stakeholders, thus
influencing the global corporate reputation.
Second, the variables regarding the board of directors are also considered
(full model). At this stage, the companies with a high presence of women in their
boardroom are more likely to appear in the reputation ranking. Female directors can
give a new perspective and improve strategy formulation. Agency conflicts may also
be minimized by increased levels of gender diversity, thereby improving a firm’s
outcomes. In addition, the role of women in society has become an increasingly relevant
issue, and the need for their presence in boards of directors has been emphasized by
both academics and policymakers (Terjesen et al., 2009). Companies with a higher
number of women in the board of directors may improve the market’s perception and
thus influence corporate reputation. The association between the control variables
and corporate reputation remains constant, and the explanatory power of the
model increases.
The second stage of our empirical analysis aims to determine whether the board of
director characteristics are associated with the level of corporate reputation. The
dependent variable REP_VALUE measures a company’s level of the reputation.
For this study, a regression analysis was performed, considering only firms that were
listed on IGBM and also included in the MERCO index. As a result, the final sample is
made up of 145 firm-year observations.
Table IV shows the descriptive statistics for this reduced sample. Descriptive
statistics of corporate governance variables are similar to the numbers in Table II.
The mean of the variable reputation of the president indicates that 80 per cent of the
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum VIF
REP_VALUE 118.14 65.94 35.75 299.65
B_IND 36.62 16.36 6.67 80 1.332
CEO 0.80 0.40 0 1 1.141
B_WOM 7.51 8.91 0 33.33 1.175
B_ACT 10.01 3.89 4 27 1.329
SIZE 26.97 33.92 0.25 155.86 1.360
ROA 5.28 7.27 −21.68 43.53 1.252
REP_PRESD 0.80 0.40 0 1 1.049
LEV 0.73 0.136 0.269 0.975 1.351
Notes: REP_VALUE, reputation value is a relative measure which takes the average reputation value
as a reference of 100 points; B_IND, board independence indicates the percentage of independent
directors on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 if the CEO is
also the chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the percentage of women on the
board; B_ACT, board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a year; SIZE, firm size is
measured by total assets (in million of euros); ROA, return on assets; REP_PRESD: reputation
of the president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the president of the company is included in
MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise; LEV: ratio of total debt to total assets. 145 firm-year observations
(years 2004-2010)
Table IV.
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presidents of firms that are in the corporate reputation rankings are included in
MERCO Líderes. This value is significantly higher than that obtained for the whole
sample in Table II, and consequently, a clear effect of the president of a firm on its
corporate reputation is initially found. The VIF coefficients are presented in Table IV
and, since their value ranges from 1.049 to 1.360, the lack of multicollinearity among the
variables is confirmed.
Table V summarizes the results of the multivariate regression analysis. The
Hausman test confirmed that the application of a fixed-effect model is better than an
approach based on random effects. The model was estimated for panel data for seven
years (2004-2010) using intercept dummies for individual years to capture fixed effects
(Greene, 1997, p. 621) and therefore minimize temporal effects.
Initially, only the control variables are included in the regression analysis (Model 1
in Table V). Bigger companies and companies with a president that is included in
MERCO líderes rank higher in the reputation index. These findings corroborate the
results found in the previous analysis. Firm size and the image of the president of a
company consistently appear as determinants of corporate reputation.
The inclusion of the variables related to the board of directors enhances the
explanatory power of the model up to 34.1 per cent (Model 2 in Table V). Both board
independence and board gender are positively associated to the level of corporate
reputation. The value of the coefficient on the B_IND is 0.449, significant at 5 per cent
and the value on the B_WOM variable is 1.287, also significant at 5 per cent. The
significance of these variables indicates that the characteristics of the boards of
directors that are in line with the recommendations of the codes of good governance are
positively associated with corporate reputation. Companies that are on top of MERCO
rankings tend to have a higher percentage of independent directors and more female
directors on their boards. Previous research has found that directors provide valuable
expertise, advice, counsel to firms and can also increase a firm’s credibility (Lester et al.,
2008). In particular, independent directors are more likely to protect stakeholders’
interests. They can help minimize agency conflicts and achieve better outcomes, and
therefore companies with a higher proportion of independent directors are more valued
in terms of reputation. These results are consistent withH1b. Our results also suggest a
positive association between the presence of women on the board and corporate
reputation, as discussed above. Companies with a higher percentage of female directors
are not only more likely to appear in the reputation ranking, but these companies also
receive a greater reputation score. These results confirm H2.
Furthermore, endogeneity issues were addressed in order to enhance the study’s
internal validity. One of the most common solutions is to use instrumental variables
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). The applicability of a two-stage estimation procedure
was studied, but this method had to be discarded due to the impossibility of finding
appropriate instruments associated with the board variables but not with the reputation
variable. As Wintoki et al. (2012) indicate, it is very difficult to find strictly exogenous
instruments in corporate governance research.
An alternative solution is the generalized method of moments, which has been
widely used in the literature to solve endogenity issues (Acero and Alcalde, 2012a, b;
García-Ramos and García, 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). However, it was not possible to
use it in our case due to the limited sample size.
Finally, the endogenity issue was addressed by accounting for the fact that a firm’s
corporate governance history affects its current reputation. A third model was
introduced in Table V where the board variables are lagged. Model 3 in Table V shows
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Explanatory variables Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 90.685***
(3.28)
57.040*
(1.85)
−44.900
(−1.62)
B_IND + 0.449**
(2.24)
CEO + −1.372
(−0.21)
B_WOM + 1.207**
(2.41)
B_ACT + −0.687
(−0.08)
B_INDt-1 + 0.414**
(1.75)
CEOt-1 + −0.481
(−0.07)
B_WOMt-1 + 1.004*
(1.66)
B_ACTt-1 + −0.612
(−0.55)
SIZE + 0.528***
(4.58)
0.409***
(3.35)
0.416***
(3.34)
ROA ? −1.368
(−1.60)
−1.06
(−1.26)
−2.367
(−2.61)
REP_PRESD + 18.260***
(2.90)
14.069**
(2.19)
17.440***
(2.37)
LEV ? 7.954
(0.24)
28.396
(0.82)
24.972
(0.69)
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.341 0.425
F ( p-value) 10.72
(0.000)
6.85
(0.000)
18.27
(0.000)
White’s test ( χ2) ( p-value) 14.77
(0.322)
48.62
(0.223)
48.40
(0.230)
Fixed effects model: Model 1: REP_VALUEit¼ α+β1SIZEit+β2ROAit+β3REP_PRESit+β4LEVit+ ε
Model 2: REP_VALUEit¼ α+β1B_INDit+β2CEOit+β3B_WOMit+β4B_ACTit+β5SIZEit+β6ROAit
+β7REP_PRESit+β8LEVit+ ε
Model 3: REP_VALUEit¼ α+β1B_INDit-1+β2CEOit-1+β3B_WOMit-1+β4B_ACTit-1+β5SIZEit+β6ROAit
+β7REP_PRESit+β8LEVit+ ε
Notes: REP_VALUE, reputation value is a relative measure which takes the average reputation value as
a reference of 100 points; B_IND, board independence indicates the percentage of independent directors
on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 if the CEO is also the
chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the percentage of women on the board;
B_ACT, board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a year; B_INDt-1, board independence
in the yeart-1; CEOt-1, CEO independence in the year t-1; B_WOMt-1, board women in the year t-1;
B_ACTt-1, board activity in the year t-1; SIZE, firm size is measured by total assets (in million of euros);
ROA, return on assets; REP_PRESD, reputation of the president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if
the president of the company is included in MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise; LEV, ratio of total debt to
total assets. 145 firm-year observations for Models 1 and 2; 113 firm-year observations for Model 3 (years
2004-2010). A White’s test is used to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is
homogeneous. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. p-values for the variables
with an expected sign are one-tailed, the p-values for the other variables are two-tailed
Table V.
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how corporate reputation of the current year is influenced by governance structures
from the previous year. The results confirm that a higher percentage of independent
directors and female directors in the previous year is positively associated with the
level of corporate reputation in the current year. In addition, the possible simultaneity is
solved in Model 3 as it is impossible that current reputation affects past board
characteristics. In addition, control variables in the current year will not be associated
with past board characteristics.
5. Sensitivity analyses and additional tests
As a sensitivity analysis, additional measures of size and firm performance were
considered. A total sales (SALES) variable was used as a proxy for firm size, and the
market-to-book ratio (MTB) was employed to measure financial performance. Table VI
presents the results of this analysis for the logistic and the multivariate regressions.
These new variables were both individually and simultaneously included in the
regressions, and the results remained constant.
In addition, a more in-depth analysis was performed in order to study how firm size
and profitability interact with the board of director variables. Table VII shows the
results of this analysis for both the logistic regression and the multivariate regression.
The results from the logistic regression indicate that firm size and profitability clearly
moderate the relationship between the board of director characteristic and corporate
reputation. The inclusion of a firm in the reputation ranking is highly determined by its
size. The board of directors of bigger companies appears as a non-significant variable
for the determination of corporate reputation. Regardless of the structure of their board
of directors, larger firms take advantage of their visibility to influence the perception
that the markets have of them and maximize their reputation. On the other hand,
the boards of directors in firms with a better profitability play a more important role in
the determination of corporate reputation. Board independence, as well as gender
diversity, contributes to the inclusion of a firm in the reputation ranking. For these
companies, the boards of directors appear to be more visible and influential in terms of
corporate reputation.
However, the results from the multivariate regression are slightly different.
In general, the isolated effect of board variables is greater that the joint effect together
with firm size and profitability. Board independence, and specially gender diversity, are
decisive factors relating to a firm’s level of reputation, regardless its size and
profitability.
6. Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to test the association between corporate governance
characteristics and corporate reputation. Based on agency theory and resource
dependence theory several board of director characteristics were selected. The
reputation ranking provided by MERCO was used to measure corporate reputation.
Logistic and multivariate regression analyses were performed in order to determine
whether the board of director characteristics could be associated with both the
likelihood of the company being included in the reputation ranking published by
MERCO and the level of corporate reputation.
The most reputable companies are more likely to have more female directors on
their board. Results also show that companies that appear on top of the reputation
ranking tend to have a higher percentage of independent directors and more female
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directors on their board. In addition, firm size is associated with corporate reputation.
Larger firms are more visible and better known by society, and this can influence their
image in the market. The image of the president of a company is also linked to the
reputation of the company itself.
These findings shed some light on the value of board of directors. Companies may
have incentives to improve corporate governance mechanisms since corporate
reputation is an intangible resource associated with many potential benefits for firms.
The results have direct implications for the management of corporate governance
mechanisms by shareholders who should take into account its role in the creation and
Logistic regression
(406 firm-year observations)
Multivariate regression
(145 firm-year observations)
Explanatory
variables
Predicted
sign
REP_
RANK
REP_
RANK
REP_
RANK
REP_
VALUE
REP_
VALUE
REP_
VALUE
Intercept −3.952***
(−4.12)
−2.337***
(−2.61)
−3.244***
(−3.45)
41.422***
(1.35)
34.228
(1.38)
15.792
(0.65)
B_IND + −0.000
(−0.08)
−0.006
(2.27)
−0.003
(−0.28)
0.510**
(2.53)
0.456**
(2.27)
0.518**
(2.56)
CEO + 0.178
(0.49)
0.308
(0.87)
0.169
(0.46)
−0.707
(−0.11)
−0.710
(−0.11)
0.102
(0.02)
B_WOM + 0.058***
(3.45)
0.059***
(3.57)
0.060***
(3.47)
1.277**
(2.50)
1.265**
(2.52)
1.365***
(2.68)
B_ACT + 0.044
(0.83)
−0.000
(−0.01)
0.043
(0.81)
−0.090
(−0.10)
−0.073
(−0.08)
−0.097
(−0.11)
SIZE + 0.133***
(4.07)
0.401***
(3.24)
SALES + 0.449***
(4.64)
0.462***
(4.76)
0.825***
(2.82)
0.781***
(2.62)
ROA ? 0.019
(1.25)
−1.204
(−1.40)
MTB ? −0.476
(−1.44)
−0.389
(−1.17)
4.346
(0.69)
4.268
(0.67)
REP_PRESD + 3.267***
(8.49)
3.057***
(8.31)
3.170***
(8.52)
14.632***
(2.24)
13.573**
(2.10)
14.086**
(2.14)
LEV ? 1.200
(1.17)
0.554
(0.55)
0.700
(0.67)
46.300
(1.35)
48.317
(1.61)
69.215**
(2.36)
Adjusted R2 0.535 0.516 0.535 0.322 0.334 0.312
F ( p-value) 300.81
(0.000)
290.31
(0.000)
300.80
(0.000)
6.29
(0.000)
6.64
(0.000)
6.01
(0.000)
Notes: REP_RANK, reputation rank is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in
MERCO ranking and 0 otherwise; REP_VALUE, reputation value is a relative measure which takes
the average reputation value as a reference of 100 points; B_IND, board independence indicates the
percentage of independent directors on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with
a value of 0 if the CEO is also the chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the
percentage of women on the board; B_ACT, board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a
year; SIZE, firm size is measured by total assets (in million of euros); ROA, return on assets. SALES,
firm size is measured by total sales (in million of euros); MTB, market-to-book ratio; REP_PRESD,
reputation of the president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the president of the company is
included in MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise. LEV, ratio of total debt to total assets. *,**,***Significant
at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. p-values for the variables with an expected sign are
one-tailed, the p-values for the other variables are two-tailed
Table VI.
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maintenance of corporate reputation and therefore in the value of their investments.
Furthermore, our evidence extends previous findings in this research area, by
highlighting the role that the president of the company may play in the market’s
perception of her or his firm.
This paper provides interesting insights into the association between corporate
governance and corporate reputation. However, a number of potential future research
lines can be identified. The impact of specific company director traits (such as CEO
experience or directors’ expertise) and ownership structure on corporate reputation
may be an interesting line of future research.
Logistic regression
(406 firm-year observations)
Multivariate regression
(145 firm-year observations)
Explanatory variables REP_RANK REP_RANK REP_VALUE REP_VALUE
Intercept −2.745***
(−4.55)
0.002**
(2.40)
75.161***
(2.83)
78.513***
(3.46)
B_IND×SIZE 0.002
(1.54)
0.008***
(3.52)
CEO× SIZE 0.026
(0.41)
0.047
(0.31)
B_WOM× SIZE 0.000
(0.18)
0.017*
(1.72)
B_ACT× SIZE 0.005
(0.93)
−0.006
(−0.049)
B_IND×ROA 0.002**
(2.40)
0.005
(0.22)
CEO×ROA −0.053*
(−1.71)
−0.461
(−0.54)
B_WOM×ROA 0.004**
(2.56)
0.079*
(1.53)
B_ACT×ROA −0.001
(−0.52)
−0.143
(−1.48)
SIZE 0.110***
(3.63)
0.495***
(4.21)
ROA 0.021
(1.57)
−0.996
(−1.20)
REP_PRESD 3.192***
(8.45)
3.418***
(8.62)
19.153***
(3.16)
17.695***
(2.81)
LEV 1.133
(1.25)
2.218**
(2.23)
30.849
(0.97)
23.809
(0.73)
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.518 0.358 0.303
F( p-value) 283.12
(0.000)
291.59
(0.000)
8.52
(0.000)
6.64
(0.000)
Notes: REP_RANK, reputation rank is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in
MERCO ranking and 0 otherwise; REP_VALUE, reputation value is a relative measure which takes
the average reputation value as a reference of 100 points; B_IND, board independence indicates the
percentage of independent directors on the board; CEO, CEO independence is a dummy variable, with
a value of 0 if the CEO is also the chairman and 1 otherwise; B_WOM, board women indicates the
percentage of women on the board; B_ACT, board activity indicates the number of board meetings in a
year; SIZE, firm size is measured by total assets (in million of euros); ROA, return on assets.
REP_PRESD, reputation of the president is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the president of the
company is included in MERCO Líderes and 0 otherwise. LEV, ratio of total debt to total assets.
*,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively
Table VII.
Interaction analysis
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Notes
1. www.hillandknowlton.com/about
2. The analysis was actually performed by Hill and Knowlton in 2001. More than 1,000
questionnaires were completed by business executives from eight nations.
3. The analysis was performed through 282 telephone interviews with buy and sell-side
analysts, from all over the world, with over two years experience.
4. www.merco.info/es/countries/4-es
5. Additional variables were also considered (industry and firm age) but they appeared as non-
significant variables. Furthermore, due to multicollinearity problems, they were excluded
from the statistical models.
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